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Speech as Delivered by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the World Affairs Council Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Thursday, November 3, 1994

Secretary Perry: I've recently returned from a long scheduled trip to China. Originally this was to be a trip to China and back again, but events conspired against the trip turning out as simple as that. Indeed, a week before I was supposed to leave for the China trip, Saddam Hussein sent his Republican Guard forces into the southern part of Iraq up to the boarder of Kuwait, and that caused us to make an immediate response of sending forces over to the Kuwait border. As a result of that, I amended my plans to include a stop-off in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to speak with government officials and to meet with our troops there. I did that on the way to my trip to China.

Then while I was in China, the United States and the North Korean government came to the so-called Framework Agreement on termination of the nuclear weapon program in North Korea, and President Clinton asked me to stop in South Korea and Japan in the way back to meet with the government officials in those countries to discuss the agreement.

So what started off to be a reasonably simple over to China and back trip, ended up being around the world in 80 days--although I did it in ten days. Ten days and seven countries.

Today, I want to talk to you about two aspects of that trip which are security policies with regard to the People's Republic of China and security policies with regard to the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea--what we call North Korea. These are the two most significant remaining communist countries in the world today. In fact, about the only two of any significance that are left.

I'd like to begin by noting that while I was in China, our delegation was treated to some rare delicacies which you probably don't have often here in Philadelphia. We had turtle and snake stew; we had fish stomach soup; and my all

time personal favorite was rendered Manchurian toad fat. [Laughter] Not just toad fat, but rendered Manchurian toad fat.

A few days earlier, I had shared--when I was in Kuwait--I had shared some of our field rations with our troops over there. These are called "Meals Ready to Eat," or MRE's. MRE's are not exactly gourmet fare, but they do beat rendered Manchurian toad fat. [Laughter]

Aside from the gourmet experiences, I had very important reasons for going to China, and they had to do with advancing President Clinton's policy on China which he calls "constructive engagement." I'll start off by saying why I think constructive engagement with China is important. China is not only the world's most populous country, it is also a regional power of very great influence in one of the most troubled regions of the world, bordering on South Asia, Russia, North Korea, Southeast Asia, and many of the former nations of the Soviet Union in Central Asia.

China has possibly the third largest economy in the world today. I say, "possibly," because it's hard to get a precise calculation to that. It has certainly the fastest growing economy of any major world power, having had economic growth rates exceeding ten percent in the last five years. Indeed, the principal economic issue in China today is how to deal with what they consider an "over-heated" economy, and what they can do to calm it down. It is, not surprisingly, leading to high inflation rates.

As a part of this constructive engagement policy, my task was to reestablish a military-to-military dialogue with the People's Liberation Army, the so-called PLA. This was my eighth visit to China, but only my second in an official capacity. On this visit, I met with the President, the Premier, Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Minister of National Defense Industries, and the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. I met with everybody of any importance on the issues that I wanted to discuss. But, the most important part of my meetings were with the various officials of the PLA, the People's Liberation Army.

The PLA is a major force in China. Those of you who are China scholars know that. Those of you who are not would be surprised at the extent of the influence that the PLA has and what goes on in China today -- far exceeding anything comparable in our own country.

The PLA has many people today--still, today--in their leadership, who were on the long march, and anybody on the long march in China just by the virtue of that fact alone has enormous influence in the country.

One of the people I spent time with on this trip was General Lio Wa Cheng, who is the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission--probably the most important military person in China. His position has no counterpart in the U.S. It's sort of a

combination of the position held by our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff combined with the National Security Adviser to the President. If you put those two positions together, you have the closest approximation to General Lio's role in China. He wears a uniform. He's still an active member of the PLA. Indeed, he has been in the PLA 64 years--active duty. He's probably never missed a day of work in that 64 years. [Laughter] He joined when he was 14, he's now 78. So, by simple subtraction, you can get 64 years in the PLA.

By happy coincidence, he was also the person who hosted me on my other official visit to China--which occurred in 1980--which was the first Defense delegation to China, which I led, at the time I was in the Carter Administration. I say, "by coincidence," General Lio was my host for the two weeks there during that visit. Therefore, I was able to speak very frankly with him about what we wanted to do on this trip and what was necessary for the Chinese to do in order to move this defense relationship forward.

For example, I announced to him, and to my other Chinese interlocutors, that there were two areas that we were not going to be discussing on this trip. One of them was arms sales and the other is the transfer of military technology. We have no interest in selling arms to China. We have no interest in transferring military technology to China, and I did not want there to be any confusion or misunderstanding on that part. So, those are the two things we didn't talk about.

Let me now quickly list for you the six things we did talk about. Beginning, of course, with regional security issues; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; nuclear testing; defense conversion; human rights; and the sixth, and last, was what we call "transparency in defense matters." That is, the ability to describe to the rest of the world what you're doing in defense strategy and programs and budget.

In these six areas we achieved--in some of them--modest progress, and in others, significant progress. In all six of them, we did have real discussions. We really engaged on those issues. By all odds, the most important issue with China is the regional security issues, particularly those as they affect the Korean Peninsula. I'm going to end up my talk discussing the Korean Peninsula, so I'm going to put that off for the time being and go to the second issue, which was proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We are, in particular, concerned with the fact that the Chinese have sold missiles to Pakistan in the past and were, perhaps, transferring missile technology as well. I stressed to the Chinese that as two of the few nations that were able to produce both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, that we had some special responsibilities to stop the proliferation of these weapons in the world. I think we made some modest progress in this regard. The Chinese agreed at the meeting to join as full members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is a regime of producers of ballistic missiles, who are joined together to prevent the proliferation

or the sale of missiles and technology to the rest of the world. Consistent with that, they have also agreed that they will not sell any medium or long range missiles to Pakistan in the future.

A third area we discussed was nuclear testing, and that's been an item of discussion with the Chinese for a number of years, and always in the past it's been a very formula kind of discussion where they explained to us you have tested many hundreds of missiles and we have a long way to go to catch up, so just stand back while we do our testing to get to the level that you're at. We did not have the usual formula discussion. Indeed, I think we made a major step forward. The Chinese agreed to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. That was a major and a very positive development.

Having pocketed that agreement, we then moved forward to try to push that back a little bit and get them to agree to join the moratorium that we and other countries are now observing on nuclear testing between now and the. I believe there's some probability that we will get them to truncate the missile test program that they have already planned which was intended to go between now and 1996. Stay tuned on that one, but I think we are probably going to make some progress in that area.

The fourth area we discussed was defense conversion. That is, using the excess capacity that exists in defense industries, in this case defense industries in China, to produce commercial products.

The goal of our discussions there was to foster business partnerships between U.S. commercial companies and Chinese defense enterprises. The partnerships would have the objective of manufacturing and marketing commercial products--primarily, manufacturing and marketing them in China.

This is going to be a long, slow road, but we did make some modest progress in the meeting and I think we will have some important developments in that area. The important specific product field which we identified was air traffic control. The Chinese have an urgent need to modernize their air traffic control system. The United States has a state of the art capability and products in that field, and I think we will find some way of getting together for the benefit of both countries.

The fifth item on our agenda was human rights. The Chinese are very sensitive not to put too fine a point on it, about our criticism of their human rights abuses. This is in their area, of course, in which the Chinese army is not having the primary responsibility. Nevertheless, they have an important influence in this area, and I felt it was important to talk to them about our concerns on human rights abuses.

I emphasized to their military leadership that anything they wanted from the United States, including enhanced military-to-military contacts, was dependent on

progress in a broader political relationship which fundamentally included their making progress in human rights.

As a result of this discussion, I cannot claim any great breakthroughs, but significantly, they did listen and they listened carefully. Also significant, they did not subject me to the usual diatribes which they give visitors who bring up the subject. Indeed, the discussion I had with the Premier, Li Pong, was especially instructive on that point. I made my point to him about human rights, and Senator Nunn who was traveling with me made his points about human rights, and then Senator Warner who was traveling with me made his points about human rights. It had been predicted that Li Pong would react very unfavorably to these comments. In fact, he said little or nothing on the subject.

After the meeting, as I was leaving and he was shaking hands with me, he said, "You notice I did not respond to your comments on human rights. This is not because I do not have strong opinions on the subject, it is because I wanted to maintain a warm environment for the visit." [Laughter]

The discussions we had with other leaders in the Chinese government were much more constructive in that area, and very much pointed to the importance of the topic and their clear understanding that whatever they felt about human rights issues, that progress on that was going to be absolutely necessary in order to have progress in other areas that were of importance to them.

The final area we discussed was what we at the Pentagon call "transparency"--being open in public about defense strategy, defense planning, defense programs, defense budgets, defense exercises, all of these things. My Chinese host told me they did not consider their current defense policies to be a threat to the United States, and I agree with that. But, I also pointed out to them that many of their neighbors did consider their military posture to be a threat to them, and that was causing instability and insecurity in the region. They had some need to reassure their neighbors.

I proposed a detailed exchange of information about defense strategy programs and budgets. We agreed on that, and the first such meeting is being scheduled as we speak. I will not try to forecast the significance of that exchange until I see the information they actually make public to us, but I am hopeful at this stage.

I got the ball rolling on that during this trip by giving the U.S. contribution to the exchange while I was in China. I was asked to, and did, give a speech at their National Defense University on U.S. defense strategy in the Asian Pacific region. It was a really very interesting experience. I arrived at the National Defense University, and there was a military band out front playing America the Beautiful, which was really a nice touch. I went in to meet the audience, and there, in addition to the students and the faculty of the National Defense University, the

first four rows of the audience was comprised entirely of three and four star generals. I think we must have had two-thirds of the leadership of the Chinese Army sitting in the audience listening to this lecture which, among other things, explained to them why we were interested in Taiwan, why we were concerned with the security of Taiwan, and why we were going to continue to be concerned with the security of Taiwan. I also explained why we kept 100,000 troops forward deployed in the Western Pacific and why we intended to continue to keep 100,000 troops forward deployed.

The talk--I was, really, very apprehensive about how it would be received. It was received very positively, very constructively, including the roughly 45 minute question period after the talk.

It was interesting to me--when I got back to the United States, I met with the Chief of General Staff of the Taiwanese Army. He had read the speech--we'd gotten a copy to him to read, too. I think it's remarkable that both he and the people that I spoke to in the People's Republic of China accepted as reasonable the statements of American security position in the Western Pacific. It's very important to me that what I say to the Taiwanese, what I say to the Koreans, what I say to the Chinese is the same message in all three countries, and it was the same message in them all. I think the role of the United States in that region is accepted by almost all the countries in that region as being one of providing security and stability in the region. All of those countries understand that the presence of U.S. military forces there plays a very important role in maintaining that security and stability.

This may be the only example in history where a country has troops in other people's country, and there is a general consensus that those troops are there not for imperialistic or expansionistic objectives, but for assuring peace and stability.

Overall, then, I think this was a very successful visit. I think the main reason it was a success was, before I arrived, the Chinese had decided that it should be a success. That is, they decided that the defense-to-defense relationship... They decided that the constructive engagement with the United States was in their best interest, and they should do what they could to support it.

I'd like to leave China and go to Korea. I want to talk in more detail about the agreement, which we reached with North Korea, which after I left China I then discussed in the Republic of Korea and Japan. I kept this for the end of my talk for two reasons. First of all, because I think it is Exhibit A to support the proposition that talking with the Chinese on security issues serves a very important United States national security interest. Secondly, I want to take the opportunity to tell you why I believe this agreement is good for the security of the United States.

On the first point, I believe that China is the only country in the world that has any significant ability to influence North Korea. It may be that no country has much ability to influence North Korea, but to the extent any country does, I believe

that country is China. So one of the reasons we wanted to establish a dialogue with China was to persuade them to use that influence in a constructive way in North Korea, in particular in helping solve the North Korea nuclear problem.

You may remember that before negotiations with the North were restarted in June, we were in a very different discussion. We were talking about imposing sanctions and we were talking about augmenting our military forces in Korea. In short, we were on a course of action last June which had a real risk of war associated with it. We were doing that not because we took lightly the risk of war, but because we believed that the danger of allowing the North Korean nuclear program to proceed was an even greater risk. So we were balancing off those two risks.

As we were discussing imposing the sanctions on North Korea as a move we could take short of military action to try to stop that program, it was obvious to anybody that looked at it carefully that the ability to make sanctions effective hinged almost entirely on China being willing to support those sanctions. Or to put it another way, China was quite capable of subverting any program of sanctions which we would have instituted against North Korea.

So, I was very interested in discussing with the Chinese what their view on this problem was.

The first and the most important conclusion is that their interest in North Korea in this regard corresponds exactly with our interests. That is, they do not want North Korea to have a nuclear weapon program. Their reasons for that conclusion are different from our reasons, but the conclusion is the same. Why do they care about North Korea having a nuclear program? It's because they see, they believe that if North Korea has a burgeoning nuclear weapon program that the pressure for other regional powers to get a nuclear weapon program will be irresistible. Those other regional powers are Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, all three of which have the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons, but all three of which have policies not to develop nuclear weapons. Policies which this country has urged and supported through the years.

The People's Republic of China is fearful, then, that if North Korea had a nuclear program, that one or more of those countries might back off those policies and decide themselves to have a nuclear weapons program. That would, as they see it, pose a security threat to them.

So we had this common interest. The second common interest we has with China was we both believed it was important for North and South Korea to have a serious dialogue towards reaching a pacification of issues on the Korean Peninsula.

The timing of my visit to China with respect to this North Korea problem was exquisite. The agreement was reached in the middle of a four day visit. So the first

two days I was there, we were discussing the "what if's." What if we don't get an agreement? And indeed, on Sunday and Monday, the first two days I was there, the probability was we were not going to get an agreement, and we were fully expecting to break off the talks on that Monday. So all of my discussions with the Chinese on Sunday and Monday were if these talks are broken off today, I want you to go to the North Korean government and explain to them that if on returning to Pyong Yang they then authorize the reprocessing of the fuel and the reloading of the reactor, they are in for big trouble, and you should try to get them to stop that.

So, here was a clear-cut example of where we wanted to use our influence on China to use their influence on North Korea in a very direct way, which had a very important bearing on our national security.

We also explained to them that the issue about which the talks were about to break off was that the North Korean government was not willing to agree to have a North/South dialogue as part of the framework agreement and we were insisting that a North/South dialogue be a part of it. It turned out the Chinese completely agreed with us on this point.

So, we had these detailed discussions with the North Koreans Monday morning, and we fully expected the talks to break off Monday afternoon. As it turned out by the end of the day Monday the North Koreans did agree to the North/South dialogue being included so we did reach an agreement.

The next day--we were talking with the Chinese--they were congratulating us on reaching the agreement and were offering support in the implementation of the agreement. That can be very important later on because this is a long and difficult path we have of actually getting this agreement implemented.

Let me conclude my talk by simply telling, in very simple terms, why I think this agreement is in the security interest of the United States. First of all, it freezes the North Korean nuclear weapon program, and freezes it immediately. This pact prevents them from restarting their existing reactor. It prevents them from reloading and reprocessing the already, the fuel rods they have already taken out of that and in those fuel rods there is enough plutonium to make four or five nuclear bombs. So that is all frozen. Also frozen is the construction of the additional reactors which they were building. It also then requires them, over time, to dismantle all of these facilities.

Now, I want to emphasize something because the newspapers have gotten this point very, very wrong. They have talked about this agreement as simply codifying what is required of North Korea under the Non-Proliferation Treaty or under the aegis of the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That is not even remotely correct. This agreement will cause them to go well beyond anything with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The freezing of the processing, the freezing of the loading of the reactor, all of that is beyond. The dismantling of the

reactor is well beyond. This requires much more out of the agreement than the Non-Proliferation Treaty would require.

Third, it requires more transparency about what North Korea has done in the past. Under this agreement, North Korea will have to undergo special inspections which will tell the world whether or not they have built any bombs with the fuel they've taken out of that reactor. If the answer to that is, "yes," then, they're required by the agreement to dismantle those bombs.

So, the agreement does deal with this nuclear problem--past, present, and future. In addition to that, it gives us leverage over North Korea in a way which we have never had in the past. It gives us leverage in the future which we have never had in the past.

We will end up providing them oil to generate electricity that will replace the electricity that the reactors would have provided them. And the agreement will end up providing them with a new kind of reactor, a so-called light water reactor, which will generate over the long term electricity for the Korean Peninsula.

The benefits they get from these are tied precisely to their compliance with these terms, and even more fundamentally over the long term, the economic benefits which they hope to get out of this depend on their easing of political tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Finally, I would observe that nothing in this agreement depends on trust of North Korea. Both in terms of the inspection provisions and in terms of the phased implementation it is step by step verifiable.

We recognize that even after this agreement, which deals only with nuclear issues, that North Korea still poses a conventional military threat, just as they have for the last number of decades. They also posed a potential problem in missile proliferation, and they also have a problem in human rights abuse. For all of these reasons, and notwithstanding this agreement, we are maintaining our conventional forces in the Republic of Korea and will continue to maintain those forces and at the level which we now have them.

We can hope that this agreement will create a political and economic environment in which there is the possibility for progress in those areas as well, but the agreement does not, in and of itself, provide for those improvements.

The Chinese philosopher Lau Tsu said, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step." That phrase has become a cliché in English today, but like a lot of cliché's, it's hung around because it contains a very large measure of truth. Right now it aptly describes how I feel about both our policy of constructive engagement with China and the deal we have made with the North Koreans on the

nuclear weapon program. In each of those cases, we have taken the first very important steps on two long journeys.

Thank you very much.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you pointed out the increasing importance of China in the balance of power in the Far East. Did you get any sense from any of them as to their support or concurrence in what you've negotiated with North Korea?

A: Yes, they strongly supported the agreement with North Korea, and offered to assist in the implementation of that agreement. We have not requested their assistance in the implementation but that might be an issue several years from now when we want to transfer the spent fuel out from North Korea. China would be one possible country that could be a recipient of that spent fuel.

Q: Has the Chinese government assured you or other members of the Clinton Administration that they are committed to ensuring that North Korea abide by all terms of the agreement we have signed with Pyong Yang regarding the nuclear issue?

A: No. [Laughter] I'm sure they were to take the position, were I to ask for such an assurance, that North Korea is a sovereign country and they do not have the right to instruct them on how to comply with the treaties. So we did not ask for that assurance, we did not receive it.

Q: Have they given you any assurance short of that, that they will do everything they can given the sovereignty issue?

A: Yes, they have. Assurances is too strong a word. What they have told me is that they would like to participate in the implementation to try to help in the implementation of the treaty, and as we bring them requests, they will look at them very positively. We have not at this point made any specific requests for that kind of assistance. I think it's very likely that we will ask them to assist.

I might say that I also, on the day before the agreement was approved, I explicitly asked them if they would contact North Korea relative to this unwillingness to include the North/South dialogue, and also to call them to warn them against starting the reprocessing and reloading if the talks did break off, and they did agree to do that. It's even possible they made that phone call that afternoon. I don't know that for a fact, but they did agree that they would get in touch with the North Korean government on those points.

Q: What particular strengths and experiences does Under Secretary Kaminski bring to his new role heading up the DoD acquisition office, and what do you expect him to achieve in that role?

A: He brings, first of all, technical strengths. He has a master's degree and Ph.D. from two small colleges known as Stanford and MIT in aeronautical engineering and electronics. He has substantial experience in acquisition. He managed the stealth program for the Defense Department -- all of the stealth

programs--during the period of the early '80s, I think it was '81 to '84. He is a man of great integrity and great objectivity. So you put competence, integrity, objectivity together, and it's a pretty good combination.

The major goals I've given him in this job, let me just pick a few of them out. First of all, to take the new law we have in acquisition reform and aggressively and successfully implement it so that we can start getting major savings in the way we conduct our acquisition programs. Secondly, to lead a program in bringing new technology in the Defense Department through technology demonstration programs. And finally, to provide a strong link between our policy office in the Pentagon and our acquisition office so that those two offices, instead of contending with each other will work together collegially to advance all of our defense interests forward. I think this is going to be a very strong appointment.

He has working for him three service acquisition executives who are very strong as well, and who are equally dedicated to acquisition reform.

As you may know, I was the acquisition executive from '77 to '81 in the Defense Department, and my now Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, was the acquisition executive during the last year. We've told Paul we want him to be the third best acquisition executive the Department's ever seen. At least. [Laughter]

Q: Is North Korea any threat to South Korea, right now?

A: North Korea remains--has the same conventional military threat to South Korea that they've had for the last few decades. They have nearly a million men in their army, two-thirds of whom are based close to the border. They have massed artillery along the border, most of which is capable of reaching Seoul. They're in dug in and highly protected positions.

They pose a substantial conventional military threat to South Korea, and that has been true for several decades. That was one of the reasons we were so concerned about adding to this threat a potential nuclear convention.

To take your "right now" a little more literally, do they pose a threat this week or this month? The answer is "no." Their forces are not in a state of readiness, at this time, and indeed, some substantial percentage are out harvesting the crop right now, so we have no basis at all for believing that they have any hostile military intents, at this time. So, the conventional military threat is there in capability, but we see no evidence that they are deploying it and exercising it in such a way that they intend to use it in the near future.

Q: When you talked about China and nuclear proliferation, you mentioned missile sales to Pakistan. Would you mind shedding some light on why this particular joint is so important to the American interest? And if so, if it has anything to do with the freedom fight and human rights struggle in the Kashmir?

A: First of all, we're concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missile technology to any new country in the world, any country not now possessing it. That includes Pakistan, that includes India.

India is in the process of developing their own ballistic missile program, and Pakistan has sought to buy ballistic missiles as a counter-weight to this. Each country is also developing nuclear weapons. So we see the prospect of a ballistic missile nuclear weapon arms race as a potential in those countries. We do not see an arms race underway today. We're worried about the potential.

What does the Kashmir have to do with that? The Kashmir is a flashpoint between the two countries. It's an area of great disagreement, which could lead the two countries into a--which would provide the basis for a confrontation between the two countries.

There have been, already, military confrontations between India and Pakistan. They have been serious enough, as they were... And, now, if you have this possibility of military confrontation, aggravated now by having ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, you take what is a very bad situation and convert it into what could become a catastrophic situation.

Q: From your visit to China, do you see any possibilities for the relationship between China and Taiwan to improve?

A: I think it's very hard to predict how quickly that relationship is going to evolve. It is evolving, and it's being driven primarily by economic considerations. Taiwan has a business acumen, and technology, which are very interesting and very useful in China, and therefore, both countries have benefited by economic trade in the last number of years.

It's quite possible that that will expand and even explode. If that happens, that might create a condition under which some kind of political accommodation could be reached. But taking that last step is a great leap forward in imagination. I don't quite see in detail how that would happen, but I can definitely see a substantial improvement in relationships being driven by the needs and desires of both countries to trade with each other.

Q: On the question of human rights. The question of human rights has also a tremendous importance for a large area of South and Southeast Asia where countries like Burma and Malaysia and in a particular sort of way Singapore and Vietnam have very questionable practices for individual human rights. Do we coordinate into some kind of general format with--of course, variations depending on the country--our concern for human rights? Or, are we particularly consistent and observant as far as China is concerned and probably less where the other countries are concerned?

A: We have consistently tried to influence countries to observe human rights and to stop human rights abuses. Our success in doing that depends on the

leverage we have for the country. Some countries we have no leverage at all, in which case we're just lecturing them probably to no purpose. Other countries we do have some leverage and we've had a fair degree of success.

In the case of China, that's in a transition period now. We don't have much leverage, but we have the possibility of gaining more leverage through this constructive engagement.

A very interesting chicken-and-egg problem here is that because we do not approve of the human rights, we have not been engaging them, but because we're not engaging them, we don't have much leverage to try to deal with the human rights problem.

So, what we're trying to do is edge this along very carefully, to get more engagement so we can get more influence. As we have more influence, and succeed in influencing human rights in a positive way, then we have a basis for even more. So it's a step-by-step. This is this long journey that I was talking about. We're going to do it step by step.

Q: The explanation that is given to us by the countries in Southeastern and South Asia is, they have their own particular cultural--so to speak--definition of human rights, and that they do not want to import and transplant our own philosophy. This is the justification they find for whatever situations are there. And, therefore, we violate their own cultural freedom if we try to import our own concepts of human rights, our own system of democracy. How do we respond to that? And, thank you very much.

A: My response to that is that it's not up to the United States to define human rights standards. There are international standards of human rights--international organizations trying to promote human rights. What we are trying--to the extent we're bringing bilateral country-to-country pressure on other countries --is not to make them like the United States, or like America, it's to get them to conform to international standards on human rights.

Q: I can't resist the opportunity of seeing you here in Philadelphia, and particularly the sponsorship of this forum, to ask you a question about a program that I know you're addressing and I know is terribly important to the country in a number of different respects which is, in fact, the V-22 tilt-rotor program being worked on by Boeing and Textron.

This is a program that, as you know, has very strong support from a number of the military communities that see it as a revolutionary capability. But, it also strikes me that it fits absolutely perfectly the kind of priorities that you yourself and President Clinton have set for defense conversion, the application of civil technologies to military purposes, and the flow of military investment and technology back to the civil sector, export earning, potential technologies, and so on.

This is a program that is on your Deputy Secretary's list for possible termination in the immediate future. I think it would be a $3 billion waste of the taxpayers' money and the tragic repetition, quite possibly of the old VCR problem where an invented technology here is marketed successfully by others if it were not, in fact, brought to fruition by the Department and made a commercial option for the rest of us as well.

Could I put you on the spot by asking you to say whether this is a program that is going to survive the budget axe this time around? [Laughter]

A: Yes, you can put me on the spot, and you did put me on the spot, but I'm going to wiggle off the spot.

Let me make the following comments about the V-22. First of all, it is a program which the Marines unequivocally state need and support for. I've never seen any hesitation on the part of any Marine as they storm a beach this beach that they plan to take the beach. So, the Marines have been unwavering in their support for it.

Secondly, it has an important application also to our Special Operations Forces.

Third, it represents a technological advance which is of some significance, and which has, I believe. I'm not going to try and state the argument for it, but I believe it has important non-military applications as well.

Finally, the fourth reason for supporting the V-22 is that, as the defense industrial reason, is we need to maintain some key portions of our defense industrial base even as our defense budget decrease, because we will not be able to find equivalent capabilities in commercial industry. That's certainly true of the helicopter industry in general. It's supported by the military. It's not supported to any great extent by the commercial industry.

There are a few of our defense systems which passed that test. The V-22 would be one of them; the nuclear submarines, another one; obviously, tanks, another. You don't find commercial equivalents of them. So those are all strong reasons for supporting the V-22, and they're very much in my mind.

I had a very detailed discussion on the V-22 just yesterday with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I will be making a final decision on that and the other programs in his famous memorandum in about two weeks. I'm not going to preempt myself by guessing , by hinting what some of those decisions reached now. But I will be making a final decision on that in about two weeks.

We have to have that decision, of course, before the budget gets put to bed so I have to have it within a month.

Q: My question has to do with military conversion for political purposes, i.e., the examples in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti. I'm not sure if that is classified as a political conversion, but how do you see the U.S.' role in defense and in the military particularly in the developmental context in the future? Are we going to do more humanitarian activities, or are we going to sit back and let the UN take a larger share of that?

A: We have, as I see it, three major kinds of demands on our military forces. The first of those is to have a force which is capable of fighting and winning a major conflict if we were to ever get in one. If we maintain a force capable of fighting and winning, it greatly reduces the possibility that we will ever have to fight. We have sized that force so, in our judgment, it would be capable of winning quickly and decisively a war of the size of a battle with Korea or a battle with Iraq. Our military forces are sized to deal with those kinds of problems and deal with them quickly and decisively and with minimum casualties. That's the most important requirements on our military forces.

Secondly, we have military forces capable of going into contingency operations where what is at steak is not a war here, but a military action to gain some diplomatic or political objective. The two examples going on today are Bosnia or Haiti. In neither of those cases are we prepared nor would we need to fight a war, an we're not expecting to fight a war in those cases. But we are using military forces to achieve security objectives in those two countries.

The force we have is capable of doing the first job; incidentally, has the capability of being able to do the second.

The third use to which our military force is put sometimes are humanitarian needs. The most recent example of that was Rwanda where we sent... This is now where we don't use military "force," but we use military "forces." We use the capabilities that our military has to provide humanitarian relief.

I have stated several times that my job is running an Army, not running a Salvation Army. So we do not size our forces or equip them to do that job. But when certain tests are passed, we will use them. What are those tests? First of all, it has to be an emergency, a catastrophe of substantial proportions. Rwanda certainly passed that test.

Secondly, it has to be an emergency, where a very timely response is necessary . In other words, waiting a month until somebody else has the capability to do it, in the mean time, thousands of people were dying. In Rwanda there were 4,000 or 5,000 people a day dying in the camps there because they did not have pure water. They were dying of cholera. Cholera is very easy to fix. All you have to do is provide people with pure water and they don't get it any more.

So we, it was a case where every day you delayed, another 4,000 or 5,000 people had died.

The third task is that the U.S. military has to have the unique capability to do that. One of the relief organizations, or UN organizations, set up to provide humanitarian relief could not do the job. That was manifestly true in the case of Rwanda. Nobody else had the combination of engineering capability and airlift that could get that equipment into Africa in the day or two it was necessary in order to do that.

So, given that combination of circumstances, President Clinton authorized me to dispatch our engineering forces over there--not military forces, not combat forces, but engineering forces, to get pure water into the refugee camps immediately. We had it there within two days later the President authorized me to do that. One day after we arrived, we were delivering fresh water to the camps and the death rates went from 5,000 a day down to a few hundred day in the matter of just a few days. We stayed on until the relief organizations who sere doing this job. We're there and manned up. Then we turned some of our equipment over to them, and left. We now have all of our forces out of Rwanda. We did the job we went in to do. Once we had it done, we went home again.

That example illustrates the three tests that I give you. any time another humanitarian emergency comes up that meets those three tests then I think it's very likely the President will authorize me to dispatch forces to do that.

There was one other factor which we take into account and which we certainly took into account in Rwanda. When we go in to provide humanitarian operations, we don't have our forces killed doing that.

So, we look at the security risk in going in, as well. We were sending in engineering forces to run water purification equipment. We were not concerned about... There was no military action going on, there was no likelihood that the forces were going to be attacked. Nevertheless, it was a very chaotic situation, just recovering from the civil war.

So, in addition to sending in 1,000 engineering troops, I sent in combat troops to guard the engineers while they were there. Then, they'd come out. They were not there to fight anyway, they were just there to provide Guard forces for Engineers. We've performed that whole operation without losing a single person.

I might mention, incidentally in Haiti, we have to date performed that operation without having any military casualties either. An important component of that operation is humanitarian.

In Bosnia, while we are there for a variety of reasons, one component of what we're doing in Bosnia is providing humanitarian relief. We have airlift and air drop planes that are providing food and medicine and the blankets to the villages that are cut off from the ground supplies. We have an operation there that's almost to

the magnitude of the Berlin airlift going on in Bosnia. It's been going on for the last couple of years. That part of Bosnia is a humanitarian operation. Nobody else in the world has the capability to do what we're doing, so we're providing it.

Thank you very much.

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